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Abstract
Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad
participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof
equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where
each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate
emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this
result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum
of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement
can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equi-
librium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that
one need not trade-off a “narrow but deep” treaty with a “broad
but shallow” treaty.
1 Introduction
In simple dynamic models of international environmental public good
provision, such as mitigation of climate change, Barrett (1999, 2002)
has argued that there is a trade-off between “narrow but deep” and
“broad but shallow” treaties: either only a few countries participate
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each with a large abatement, or many countries participate each with a
small abatement.
By applying the Barrett (1999) model, where each country has a
binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting
(no abatement), Asheim et al. (2006) show that extended participation
is feasible. They show that participation can essentially be doubled in a
two-region world.
The analysis of Asheim et al. (2006) exploits the fact that Barrett
(1999) considers only strategy profiles with a special structure, namely
where there is a subset of participating countries (“signatories”) in a
treaty, and where a defecting signatory is punished by having all other
signatories defect in the next period (only). Then if there are too many
signatories, these will gain by renegotiating back to cooperation with-
out imposing the punishment, thereby undermining the credibility of the
equilibrium. Asheim et al. (2006) limit the number of punishing coun-
tries by letting a defection be punished only by the other signatories in
the same region, while the signatories in the other region continue to
cooperate.
The possibility that only a subset of the signatories within a global
treaty punishes a deviant is investigated to its logical conclusion by Froyn
and Hovi (2008) within the binary choice model of Barrett (1999). They
show that full participation can indeed by implemented as a weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
It is still an open question whether these insights carry over to a
continuum choice model like the one considered by Barrett (2002). To
reach a Pareto-efficient agreement in such a setting, one need not only
agree on a broad treaty with full participation, but also a deep treaty
where each country’s abatement is at an efficient level.
By considering a model where the public benefits of emission abate-
ment are linear and private costs of emission abatement are quadratic,
we show as our main result (Proposition 1) that such an efficient broad
and deep treaty can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-
proof equilibrium, provided that the discount rate is sufficiently low and
the number of countries is sufficiently small. In the same context we also
show as an additional result (Proposition 2) how depth, but not broad-
ness, must be compromised for high discount rates and a large number
of countries.
Since low time discounting and a short detection lag contribute to a
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low discount rate, and high time discounting and a long detection lag
contribute to a high discount rate,1 these results mean that
• low time discounting and a short detection lag combined with a
small number of countries contribute to the feasibility of a Pareto-
efficient agreement, with full participation and efficient depth,
• high time discounting and a long detection lag combined with
a large number of countries undermine the feasibility of Pareto-
efficient depth of cooperation. However, such a shallower agree-
ment still allows full participation.
Both results follow from a technical result (Theorem 1), in which we
characterize the set of weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria for a class of
repeated game strategy profiles, where punishments last for one period
only (Abreu, 1986; van Damme, 1989), but where participation in the
treaty, participation in the punishment, the depth of the treaty and the
severity of the punishment are parameters which are allowed to vary.
Linear benefits of abatement represent a simplification. Asheim et
al. (2006) show that their result holds also when abatement yields non-
linear benefits. It would be of value to check whether our findings carry
over to a less restrictive model with non-linear benefits of abatement
and asymmetric countries, as considered in the two-country model in
Finus and Rundshagen (1998). However, we remain within the context
of linear benefits in the present paper, as it is an analytically tractable
setting which allows us to characterize weak renegotation-proofness.
Sections 2 and 3 present our results, while Section 4 contains a dis-
cussion of their relevance. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Main result
Consider a world with n ≥ 2 countries, where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes
the set of all countries. The countries interact in periods (or “stages”)
0, 1, 2, . . . . The countries are identical in all relevant characteristics. In
every period, each country i must choose a non-negative level of abate-
ment qi of greenhouse gas emissions. Each country i’s periodic payoff,
1If r is the positive rate of time discounting, and ∆ is the detection lag (= period
length), then the per-period discount factor, δ, is given by δ =
∫∆
0
e−rtdt and the
per-period discount rate is 1− δ.
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relative to the situation where no country abates, is given by
pii = b
n∑
j=1
qj − c
2
(qi)
2 , (1)
where b is the marginal benefit from abatement (which is a pure public
good that benefits each and every country), and (c/2)(qi)
2 represents
the total abatement costs of country i. We assume that b, c > 0.
Following Barrett (1999, 2002) and Asheim et al. (2006), we abstract
from the future benefits of abatement (which of course are important
in the climate change setting; cf. Dutta and Radner, 2007), meaning
that the situation can be modeled as an infinitely repeated game, with a
stage game where the countries simultaneously and independently choose
abatement levels, and receive payoffs according to (1).
The stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium where each country
abates
q1 =
b
c
.
Actually, for each country, q1 strictly dominates any other action of the
stage game and is thus its unique best response independently of what
the other countries’ abatement levels are. However, the unique symmet-
ric Pareto-efficient abatement profile entails that each country abates
qn =
nb
c
. (2)
Hence, the Pareto-efficient abatement is n times the abatement level in
the Nash equilibrium of the stage game, cf. Barrett (2002, p. 540). In
particular, the n countries would want to agree on implementing
a = (qn, . . . , qn︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N
), (qn, . . . , qn︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N
), . . . ,
where each country contributes to the Pareto-efficient total abatement
in a cost-efficient manner in every period.
In the absence of third-party enforcement, such a Pareto-efficient
agreement needs to be self-enforcing, where deviations from this agree-
ment—leading to a short-run benefit for the deviating country—is de-
terred through the threat of future punishment, which must also be self-
enforcing. Here, “self-enforcing” refers to the play of a non-cooperative
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game; the analysis of such equilib-
ria requires the introduction of some game-theoretic formalism.
4
A history at the beginning of stage t describes the countries’ abate-
ment levels in periods 0, . . . , t− 1:
(q1(0), . . . , qn(0)), (q1(1), . . . , qn(1)), . . . , (q1(t− 1), . . . , qn(t− 1)) .
A strategy σi for country i is a function which for every history, in-
cluding the “empty” history at the beginning of stage 0, determines an
abatement level for player i. Country i’s average discounted payoff in
the repeated game is given by(
1− δ) ∞∑
t=0
δtpii(t) , (3)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and pii(t) is country i’s peri-
odic payoff according to (1) in stage t when the abatement profile is
(q1(t), . . . , qn(t)). A strategy profile (σ1, . . . , σn) is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium if, for every history, there is no country that can increase
its discounted payoff by deviating from its strategy, provided that all
other players follow their strategies in the continuation of the game. A
subgame-perfect equilibrium is weakly renegotiation-proof (Farrell and
Maskin, 1989) if there do not exist two histories such that all players
strictly prefer the continuation equilibrium in the one to the continua-
tion equilibrium in the other.
We can now state our main result.
Proposition 1 For any positive integer n ≥ 2 and positive real numbers
b and c, there exists a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium with a as
the equilibrium path if the countries’ repeated game payoffs are discounted
by discount factor δ in the interval
[
(n− 1)/n, 1).
In the remainder of this section, we describe a strategy profile with
an uncomplicated structure, leading to the Pareto-efficient agreement a.
According to a general theorem stated in the next section, this strat-
egy profile is a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria for δ ≥ (n − 1)/n,
thereby proving Proposition 1. Since δ ≥ (n− 1)/n is equivalent to the
discount rate, 1 − δ, not exceeding 1/n, this shows that a can be im-
plemented in a self-enforcing manner, provided that the discount rate is
sufficiently low and the number of countries is sufficiently small. In the
next section we also consider slightly more complicated renegotiation-
proof equilibria that implement a in a self-enforcing manner even if
δ < (n− 1)/n, provided that (10) and (11) are satisfied.
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Following Abreu (1988) we consider simple strategy profiles, consist-
ing of an equilibrium path to be implemented, and n punishment paths,
one for each player. The equilibrium path is followed until a single coun-
try deviates, an occurrence that leads to this player’s punishment path
being initiated in the next period. Also any unilateral deviation from a
punishment path leads to the initiation of the (new) deviating country’s
punishment path. Through these rules, the n+1 paths specify a strategy
for each player. Hence, with a as the equilibrium path, we need only
construct the n punishment paths and show that the resulting simple
strategy profile is indeed a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
To construct the path, pi, used to punish country i, consider a func-
tion which for any n determines a subset Pi(n) ⊂ N of punishing coun-
tries. Let Pi(n) have the properties that (1) i /∈ Pi(n) and (2) the number
of countries in Pi(n) equals n/2 if n is even and (n + 1)/2 if n is odd.
The interpretation is that each country in Pi(n) punishes a unilateral
deviation by country i by choosing the abatement level q1 in the period
immediately following country i’s deviation, while countries in N\Pi(n)
(including country i) abates at the Pareto-efficient level qn. In the subse-
quent periods all countries return to the Pareto-effcient abatement level.
Hence, the punishment path of country i is:
pi = (q
1, . . . , q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈Pi(n)
, qn, . . . , qn︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N\Pi(n)
), (qn, . . . , qn︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N
), (qn, . . . , qn︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N
), . . . .
In the next section we show that, for any positive integer n ≥ 2 and
positive real numbers b and c, the simple strategy profile described by the
n+1 paths (a,p1, . . . ,pn) is a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium if
the discount factor, δ, satisfies δ ≥ (n− 1)/n. Having n/2 (or (n+ 1)/2
if n is odd) countries punishing for one period by choosing their best
response q1 of the stage game is sufficiently many to discipline a potential
deviator, while being sufficiently few to ensure that each punisher in
Pi(n) gains at least as much by reducing its abatement as it loses by the
fact that the other countries in Pi(n) abate less.
3 Participation and punishment
In this section we consider a class of strategy profiles in the repeated
games described in Section 2, and establish as Theorem 1 under what
parameter values members of this class are weakly renegotiation-proof
equilibria. Since the strategy profiles used to establish existence in
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Proposition 1 are members of this class, this result follows as a corollary
to Theorem 1. We also present Proposition 2, our result on the maximal
treaty depth for low discount factors and a large number of countries.
Fix the set of countries N = {1, . . . , n}. Let M = {ii, . . . , im} (⊆ N)
be the signatories to a treaty, with m members (where 0 < m ≤ n). The
treaty specifies that the agreement as be implemented, where
as = (qs, . . . , qs︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈M
, q1, . . . , q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N\M
), (qs, . . . , qs︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈M
, q1, . . . , q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N\M
), . . . ,
and qs = sb/c with s > 1. Hence, the signatories of the treaty abate s
times the level that constitutes the individual country’s best response,
while the non-signatories choose the best response level.
Since each signatory is not playing a best response of the stage game,
a deviation from the agreement by a signatory must be prevented by the
threat of future punishment. To construct the path, psi , used to punish
country i ∈M , consider a set Pi ⊂M of punishing countries, satisfying
i /∈ Pi. We assume that |Pi|, the number of countries in Pi, is the
same for all i ∈ M , while of course the identities of the countries may
not (and can not) be the same. Write k = |Pi|. Each country in Pi
punishes a unilateral deviation by country i by choosing the abatement
level qp = pb/c in the period immediately following country i’s deviation,
where p ≥ 0. The other signatories including country i (i.e., the countries
in M\Pi) abate at the agreed upon level qs. In the subsequent periods
all signatories return to the agreed upon level qs. All non-signatories (i.e,
j ∈ N\M) continue to play their best response q1 throughout. Hence,
the punishment path of country i ∈M is:
psi = (q
p, . . . , qp︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈Pi
, qs, . . . , qs︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈M\Pi
, q1, . . . , q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N\M
),
(qs, . . . , qs︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈M
, q1, . . . , q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N\M
), (qs, . . . , qs︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈M
, q1, . . . , q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N\M
), . . . .
Since each non-signatory is playing a best response of the stage game,
a deviation from the agreement by a non-signatory requires no punish-
ment. Hence, even if a non-signatory unilaterally deviates from as or
psi for some i ∈ M , the path in question is simply continued, meaning
that any such unilateral deviation is followed by as. Hence, formally,
the punishment path of country i ∈ N\M equals as.
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The simple strategy profile determined by the n+ 1 paths
(as,psi1 , . . . ,p
s
im , a
s, . . . , as︸ ︷︷ ︸
j∈N\M
) (4)
corresponds to what Froyn and Hovi (2008) refer to as “Penance k” . In
Theorem 1 we establish under what conditions this strategy profile is a
weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
Since the identities of the signatories and the punishing countries
do not matter, as all countries are identical, the conditions of Theorem
1 depend on only the parameters δ (the discount factor), n (the total
number of countries), m (the broadness of the treaty; i.e., the number
of signatories), k (the number of punishing countries), s (the depth of
the treaty), and p (the severity of the punishment). In fact, δ, k, s and
p are sufficient to decide whether the simple strategy profile determined
by the paths in (4) is weakly renegotiation-proof, while n and m do not
matter as long as they satisfy n ≥ m > k.
Theorem 1 The simple strategy profile determined by (4) with s > 1
and p ≥ 0 is a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium for δ ∈ (0, 1) if
and only if k, s and p satisfy s > p and
1
2δ
· (max{s− 1, |p− 1|})
2
s− p ≤ k ≤
1
2
(s+ p) . (5)
In the kind of weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria used to establish
existence in Proposition 1, we have that
s = n and p = 1 .
Then expression (5) simplifies to
1
δ
(n− 1) ≤ 2k ≤ n+ 1 . (6)
If n is even and k = n/2, then the right inequality is satisfied, and the
left inequality is satisfied if
δ ≥ n− 1
n
. (7)
If n is odd and k = (n+ 1)/2, then the right inequality is satisfied, and
the left inequality is satisfied if
δ ≥ n− 1
n+ 1
,
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which is implied by (7). In either cases, δ ∈ [(n− 1)/n, 1) is sufficient,
thus showing that Proposition 1 follows as a corollary to Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 shows that a weakly renegotiation-proof Pareto-effici-
ent agreement can be implemented if δ ≥ (n−1)/n. Hence, few countries
and a high δ, reflecting low time discounting and a short detection lag,
contribute to the feasibility of a Pareto-efficient treaty. However, it
is of interest to investigate what can be achieved with many countries
and a low δ, reflecting high time discounting and a long detection lag.
Therefore, in Proposition 2 we analyze the complement case where δ <
(n− 1)/n.
Proposition 2 Assume δ ∈ (0, (n − 1)/n),2 and consider the simple
strategy profile determined by (4) with s > 1 and p ≥ 0. Maximal treaty
depth in a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium is given by
s(δ) = 1 + 2kδ + 2
√
kδ(1− k(1− δ)) , (8)
with the severity of punishment given by p(δ) = 2k − s(δ) (∈ (0, 1]), if
there exists k ∈ N s.t. (k − 1)/k ≤ δ < ((2k − 1)/2k)2, and by
s(δ) = 1 + kδ +
√
kδ(2 + kδ) , (9)
with the severity of punishment given by p(δ) = 0, if there exists k ∈
N s.t.
(
(2k − 1)/2k)2 ≤ δ < k/(k + 1). In both cases, the number
of punishing countries equals k (∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}), and the number of
participating countries can be any m satisfying k < m ≤ n.
Proposition 2, which is illustrated by Figure 1, means that Pareto-
efficient treaty depth, s = n, is feasible if and only if maximal treaty
depth, s(δ), satisfies s(δ) ≥ n. This holds under the following conditions:
n odd and δ ≥ n− 1
n+ 1
, (10)
n even and δ ≥
(
n− 1
n
)2
. (11)
In case (10), k = (n+1)/2 and p = 1, and Pareto-efficiency for the lowest
discount factor is implemented by the weakly renogotiation-proof equi-
librium considered in Proposition 1. In case (11), however, k = n/2 is
2The upper bound (n− 1)/n on the discount factor δ ensures that the number of
punishing countries k determined by the proposition is smaller than n.
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combined with p = 0, implying that Pareto-efficiency for the lowest dis-
count factor is implemented by a weakly renogotiation-proof equilibrium
with a harsher punishment than the one considered in Proposition 1.
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Figure 1: Maximal treaty depth as a function of the discount factor
The black curve depicts maximal depth of cooperation as a function of the dis-
count factor. The dotted grey, horizontal lines depict the number of punishing
countries, while the thin grey curves depict the severity of punishment.
If neither condition (10) nor condition (11) is satisfied, due to a high
n and a low δ, then Proposition 2 shows that there is no trade-off between
treaty depth and treaty broadness: treaty depth has to give, while full
participation is feasible even in a many country world with high time
discounting and long detection lags.
In the appendix we prove Theorem 1 and show how Proposition 2
follows from the theorem.
4 Discussion
In this section we first explore the equilibrium concept that underlies the
analysis, before discussing our results in the context of climate change.
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4.1 Weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium
In this paper we have applied the game-theoretic concept of “weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium” (Farrell and Maskin, 1989) to study
self-enforcing climate agreements. In this section we first discuss what
this equilibrium concept means for the significance of our results, before
providing numerical illustrations. We also indicate how our findings may
have relevance for the ongoing negotiations on a follow-up agreement to
the Kyoto Protocol.
A weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equi-
librium. This presumes that the countries are coordinated in the sense
that they all play according to a particular strategy profile described by
(4). In other words, the analysis assumes that all countries have agreed
upon who will participate in the treaty and how unilateral deviations
will be punished. Hence, the framework is designed to analyze how non-
compliance can be avoided: it shows how signatories can be induced to
fulfill their treaty obligations under the threat of future punishment.
The framework is not suitable for analyzing how coordination is
achieved: it is incapable of answering how countries manage to agree
on a particular treaty, involving strategies specifying behavior under
both compliance and non-compliance. Even though it is of interest to
consider a situation where coordination has not yet occurred and where
countries seeking a Pareto-efficient climate agreement attempt to punish
a would-be-free-rider into joining the effort, this is not an equilibrium of
a repeated game, and thus, outside the scope of the present paper.
Weak renegotiation-proofness considers the possibility of a coordi-
nated deviation by all countries, but abstracts from the possibility that
also a coordinated deviation by a subset of countries can be profitable.
Coordinated deviations by a subset of players in a game have been con-
sidered by Bernheim et al. (1987) through their concepts “coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium” in static games and “perfectly coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium” in finite horizon dynamic games. The latter concept has
been generalized to infinite horizon games by Asheim (1997, Definition
2). Perfectly coalition-proof equilibrium in infinite horizon games is not,
however, a refinement of weak renegotiation-proofness. To our knowl-
edge, there exists no refinement of the concept of weakly renegotiation-
proof equilibrium that takes into account that also a subset of players
can gain by implementing a coordinated deviation.
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4.2 Related literature on climate change
Proposition 1 is a “folk-theorem” result for weakly renegotiation-proof
equilibria, showing that an efficient outcome can be disciplined through
the threat of punishment if δ is high enough (van Damme, 1989, is
an early contribution of this kind in the case of weak renegotiation-
proofness). It shows that a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can be
implemented if δ ≥ (n− 1)/n.
We can illustrate how a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium im-
plementing a Pareto-efficient climate agreement may look like, by ap-
plying the result of Proposition 1 to a two-region world, each with n/2
countries. Refer to the regions as A and B. Since the total number of
countries is even with two equally sized regions, we may satisfy the re-
quirements on the subset Pi(n) of countries punishing a deviating coun-
try i (namely (1) i /∈ Pi(n) and (2) the number of countries in P (n)
equals n/2) by having a unilateral deviation by a country in region A
be punished by all countries in region B and vice versa.
This means that a unilateral deviation by a country in region A
triggers a one-period reduction in abatement by all countries in region
B. This inflicts an equally hard punishment on all countries in A. On
the other hand, since k = n/2 < (n + 1)/2 = (s + p)/2, it follows
from Proposition 4 of the appendix that all countries in region B strictly
benefit by carrying out the punishment.
This arrangement can be contrasted with that of Asheim et al. (2006),
where a global weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium is cast in terms of
two regional agreements. In this equilibrium, a unilateral deviation by
a country in region A triggers a one-period reduction in abatement by
all the other countries in region A, and likewise in region B. Hence, the
weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium entails that the countries that
benefit during the one-period punishment phase are in the same region
as the deviating country, while the countries in region B are harmed
twice: both by the initial unilateral deviation of a country in region A
and by the subsequent punishment by the other countries in region A.
The alternative proposed in our paper has the appealing feature of
inflicting the punishments within the region which is to blame for the
temporary break-down of cooperation, and rewarding the innocent coun-
tries of the other region. With this set-up the countries in the same re-
gion as the deviator are harmed twice, an arrangement that might have
12
a more disciplining effect on a potential deviator than the equilibrium
proposed by Asheim et al. (2006).
In the present model with a continuum choice of abatement lev-
els, there is full participation independently of the number of coun-
tries, provided that the discount rate is sufficiently high. So in a world
with 200 countries, all 200 countries abate at the Pareto-efficient level
q200 = 200b/c, with 100 countries punishing a unilateral deviation by
reducing their abatement to q1 = b/c.
In contrast, the model of Asheim et al. (2006), having a binary choice
of abatement levels, leads to a fixed absolute number of participating
countries. E.g., if the cost of abatement in the binary choice model is 8
times each country’s benefit of abatement, then the analysis of Asheim
et al. (2006) yields 18 participating countries, 9 countries in each region,
with 8 countries punishing a deviator, even in a world with 200 countries.
With these parameter values, the result that 8 countries punish carries
over to the analysis of Froyn and Hovi (2008). However, by relaxing
a restrictive assumption made by Asheim et al. (2006), namely that of
a two-region world where all other countries in the deviator’s region
must punish, they are able to construct a weakly renegotiation-proof
equilibrium where there is full participation.
What is the reason for this striking divergence between the binary
and continuum abatement choice models? Under the parameter values
of the previous paragraph, with the cost of abatement being 8 times
each country’s benefit of abatement, punishing is at least as good as
renegotiating back to cooperation only if there is at most 8 punishing
countries. Hence, in the binary choice model, the requirement for weak
renegotiation-proofness precludes more than 8 punishing countries. On
the other hand, since the binary choice is fixed, each country’s short-
term gain from non-compliance (i.e., by not abating when specified to
do so) is independent of the total number of countries. Hence, also the
requirement for subgame-perfectness is unrelated to the total number of
countries, leading to a fixed absolute number of punishing countries.
In comparison, in the continuum abatement choice model, the Pareto-
efficient abatement level of each country is a linear function of the total
number of countries: qn = nb/c (cf. equation (2)). In the equilibrium
of Proposition 1, this relaxes the requirement for weak renegotiation-
proofness (r.h.s. of (6)), but tightens the requirement for subgame-per-
fectness (l.h.s. of (6)). As we have shown, with a fixed fraction (≈ 1/2)
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of punishing countries, both these requirements are satisfied.
This difference between the binary and continuum abatement choice
models leads also to different requirements for the discount factor δ.
In the binary choice model with the cost of abatement being 8 times
each country’s benefit of abatement, Froyn and Hovi (2008) find that a
Pareto-efficient agreement with 200 countries can be implemented if the
discount factor exceeds 0.95; in fact, a discount factor equal to 0.95 is
sufficient independently of how many countries the world consists of.
In comparison, in the continuum choice model it follows from (11)
that a Pareto-efficient agreement between 200 countries can be imple-
mented if and only if the discount factor exceeds 0.99. Moreover, by
applying Proposition 2, it follows that only a shallow treaty is feasible
if δ = 0.95, with all 200 countries abating q39 = 39b/c and 20 countries
punishing a deviating country by reducing their abatement to q1 = b/c.
Hence, even though this less ambitious agreement has full participation,
the resulting total abatement is less than 20% of the Pareto-efficient
level.
Thus, Proposition 2 considers what can be implemented if δ is not
sufficiently high, echoing the kind of analysis done by Abreu (1986, 1988),
only that we here consider weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria. This
problem has been mostly ignored in the literature on self-enforcing cli-
mate agreement (with Finus and Rundshagen, 1998, Section 4, as a
notable exception). In our view, the real possibility of high time dis-
counting and long detection lags makes it a subject worthy of analysis.
To support this claim, note that the first commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol is 5 years, and the Protocol’s rules for emissions account-
ing and reporting entail that deviations will be detected no earlier than
2–3 years after the end of the commitment period. With such consider-
able time lags between deviations and punishments, the relevant discount
rate will be high, and under such circumstances, our analysis shows that
a shallow agreement might result. More generally, our findings highlight
the importance of designing a climate agreement where non-compliance
is detected early and punishments are carried out promptly. The choice
between agreements with quantitative restrictions vs. agreements where
the parties commit to use particular policy instruments, like emission
taxes, illustrate this. Our findings might serve as an argument in the fa-
vor of the latter type of agreements if these can be designed with shorter
detections lags than the former.
14
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1 and Proposition 2
In this appendix we characterize weak renegotiation-proofness for the simple
strategy profile determined by (4) when s > 1 and p ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 1
We first find through Proposition 3 the condition that ensures that this strat-
egy profile is a subgame-perfect equilibrium and then proceed to provide
through Proposition 4 the condition that ensures that such a subgame-perfect
equilibrium is weakly renegotiation-proof. Theorem 1 is a direct consequence
of Propositions 3 and 4.
Subgame-perfectness
Let αs denote the average discounted payoff of each signatory when as is
followed. Likewise, let pisi denote the average discounted payoff of a signatory
i when psi is followed.
Lemma 1 The punishment inflicted on country i through psi relative to fol-
lowing the agreement as equals
αs − pisi = (1− δ)(s− p)k
b2
c
.
Proof. By inserting as into (1) and (3), we obtain
αs = bms
b
c
+ b(n−m)b
c
− c
2
(
s
b
c
)2
. (A1)
By inserting psi into (1) and (3), we obtain
pisi = (1− δ)
(
b(m− k)sb
c
+ bkp
b
c
+ b(n−m)b
c
− c
2
(
s
b
c
)2)
+ δαs .
The lemma is obtained by subtracting pisi from α
s.
Lemma 1 gives the size of the future punishment inflicted on a signatory
when it deviates from the simple strategy profile determined by (4). This must
be compared to the short-term gain that a signatory can reap by deviating
from the abatement prescribed by this strategy profile. The size of this short-
term gain is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume that the simple strategy profile determined by (4) pre-
scribes the abatement rb/c, with r ≥ 0, for country i. Then the maximal
short-term gain that country i can reap through a unilateral deviation equals
(r − 1)2
2
· b
2
c
.
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Proof. The short-term gain of a unilateral deviation by country i does
not depend on the fixed behavior of the other countries. Furthermore, inde-
pendently of r and the behavior of the other countries, country i maximizes
its short-term payoff by choosing qi = b/c. Hence,[
b
b
c
− c
2
(b
c
)2] − [br b
c
− c
2
(
r
b
c
)2]
=
(r − 1)2
2
· b
2
c
is the maximal short-term gain that country i can reap through a unilateral
deviation.
We can now characterize subgame-perfectness for the set of strategy pro-
files considered.
Proposition 3 The simple strategy profile determined by (4) with s > 1 and
p ≥ 0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for δ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if k, s and p
satisfy s > p and
1
2δ
· (max{s− 1, |p− 1|})
2
s− p ≤ k . (A2)
Proof. If part. Let k, s and p satisfy s > 1, p ≥ 0, s > p and (A2).
We only need to check for one-period deviations, since it follows from the
theory of repeated games with discounting (Abreu, 1988, p. 390) that a
player cannot gain by a multi-period deviation if he cannot gain by some
one-period deviation.
Throughout, the strategy profile prescribes that non-signatories choose
b/c as their abatement level. Hence, even though any one-period deviation
by a non-signatory is not punished, it follows from Lemma 1 that they have
no incentive to deviate.
Signatories are prescribed to choose sb/c along as. It follows from Lemmas
1 and 2 that there is no profitable deviation if
(1− δ)(s− 1)
2
2
· b
2
c
≤ δ(1− δ)(s− p)kb
2
c
, (A3)
which can be rewritten as
1
2δ
· (s− 1)
2
s− p ≤ k . (A4)
The signatories (including country i itself) not inflicting punishment on
country i in the first stage of psi and all signatories in later stages of p
s
i are
also prescribed to choose sb/c, followed by psj if there is a unilateral deviation
by a signatory j and by as if there is no such deviation. Hence, also in these
cases there is no profitable deviation if (A4) is satisfied.
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Finally, the signatories inflicting punishment on country i are prescribed
to choose pb/c in the first stage of psi , followed by p
s
j if there is a unilateral
deviation by a signatory j and by as if there is no such deviation. By Lemmas
1 and 2, there is no profitable deviation if
(1− δ)(p− 1)
2
2
· b
2
c
≤ δ(1− δ)(s− p)kb
2
c
, (A5)
which can be rewritten as
1
2δ
· (p− 1)
2
s− p ≤ k . (A6)
Since s > 1, inequalities (A4) and (A6) are equivalent to inequality (A2).
Only-if part. Suppose s ≤ p. Since s > 1, it follows from (A3) that there
is a profitable deviation from as.
Assume that s > p. Suppose that (A4) is not satisfied. Then it follows
from (A3) that there is a profitable deviation from as. Suppose that (A6) is
not satisfied. Then it follows from (A5) that there is a profitable deviation
from the first stage of each punishment path psi .
Since (A4) and (A6) are equivalent to (A2), we have that s > p and (A2)
are necessary conditions for the subgame-perfectness of the simple strategy
profile determined by (4) with s > 1 and p ≥ 0.
Weak renegotiation-proofness
Let βsi denote the average discounted payoff of each of the signatories inflicting
punishment on country i when psi is implemented.
Proposition 4 Assume that the simple strategy profile determined by (4)
with s > 1 and p ≥ 0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for δ ∈ (0, 1). Then
this strategy profile is weakly renegotiation-proof if and only if k, s and p
satisfy
k ≤ 1
2
(s+ p) . (A7)
Proof. By the definition of weak renegotiation-proofness, we must deter-
mine when there do not exist two continuation equilibria such that all players
strictly prefer the one to the other. Given the structure of the simple strategy
profile determined by (4), there exist m+ 1 different continuation equilibria,
implementing the play of as and pji for all j ∈M .
Since the strategy profile is subgame-perfect, it follows from Proposition
3 that s > p, implying that αs > pisi . It follows that all non-signatories
as well as all signatories not inflicting punishment strictly prefer as to any
punishment path psi . If α
s > βsi , then all countries, including the punishing
signatories, strictly prefer the continuation equilibrium in the “empty” history
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to the continuation equilibrium following a unilateral deviation by country i.
If αs ≤ βsi , then the continuation equilibrium following a unilateral deviation
by country i is a best continuation equilibrium for each signatory inflicting
punishment on country i and a worst continuation equilibrium for country i
itself, implying that all players never strictly prefer one continuation equilib-
rium to another.
Hence, there do not exist two continuation equilibria such that all coun-
tries strictly prefer the one to the other if and only if
βsi −αs ≥ 0 . (A8)
By inserting psi into (1) and (3), it follows that
βsi = (1− δ)
(
b(m− k)sb
c
+ bkp
b
c
+ b(n−m)b
c
− c
2
(
p
b
c
)2)
+ δαs .
By comparing with (A1) we obtain
βsi −αs = (1− δ)(s− p)
(
1
2(s+ p)− k
)b2
c
,
implying that (A8) is equivalent to (A7).
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume δ ∈ (0, (n−1)/n), and consider the simple strategy profile determined
by (4) with s > 1 and p ≥ 0. We now apply Theorem 1 to find the maximum
treaty depth for which this simple strategy profile is weakly renegotiation-
proof, thereby proving Proposition 2. For the statement of Proposition 2 and
the working of the proof below, it is helpful to note that{[
k − 1
k
,
(
2k − 1
2k
)2)
,
[(
2k − 1
2k
)2
,
k
k + 1
)}
k∈{1, ... , n−1}
is a partition of the interval
[
0, (n− 1)/n).
It can be checked that the functions
s : (0, (n− 1)/n)→ R+
p : (0, (n− 1)/n)→ R+
as given in Proposition 2 satisfy s(δ) ∈ (1,∞) and p(δ) ∈ [0, 1] for all δ ∈(
0, (n − 1)/n). Furthermore, s(δ) − 1 ≥ |p(δ) − 1| for all δ ∈ (0, (n − 1)/n),
since s(δ) = 1 + 4δ and p(δ) = 1 − 4δ for δ ∈ (0, 14) and s(δ) ≥ 2 for δ ≥ 14 .
Hence, Theorem 1 implies that if, for every δ ∈ (0, (n − 1)/n), s(δ) is the
maximum s for which there exist p ∈ [0, s) and k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} satisfying
(A4) and (A7), then s(δ) is the maximum s also under (5) of Theorem 1.
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There are two cases to consider.
Case A: p ∈ (0, s). In this case, we can assume that (A7) is satisfied
with equality, because otherwise (A4) could have been relaxed by reducing p.
Hence, 2k = s+ p, implying that (A4) and (A7) can be rewritten as:
f(s; k, δ) := s2 − 2(1 + 2kδ)s+ (1 + 4k2δ) ≤ 0 and s < 2k . (A9)
The equation f(s; k, δ) = 0 has a solution if and only if (k − 1)/k ≤ δ. If
(k − 1)/k ≤ δ, then the maximum s for which f(s; k, δ) ≤ 0 is given by
sA(k, δ) := 1 + 2kδ + 2
√
kδ(1− k(1− δ)) .
Furthermore, sA(k, δ) < 2k is equivalent to δ <
(
(2k − 1)/2k)2. Hence, (A9)
can be satisfied for a maximized value of s if and only if (k − 1)/k ≤ δ <(
(2k − 1)/2k)2.
Case B: p = 0. In this case, (A4) and (A7) can be rewritten as:
g(s; k, δ) := s2 − 2(1 + kδ)s+ 1 ≤ 0 and s ≥ 2k . (A10)
The maximum s for which g(s; k, δ) ≤ 0 is given by
sB(k, δ) := 1 + kδ +
√
kδ(2 + kδ) .
Furthermore, sB(k, δ) ≥ 2k is equivalent to ((2k−1)/2k)2 ≤ δ. Hence, (A10)
can be satisfied if and only if
(
(2k − 1)/2k)2 ≤ δ.
The analysis of cases A and B above has the following implications:
• If there exists k¯ ∈ N s.t. ((2k¯− 1)/2k¯)2 ≤ δ < k¯/(k¯+1), then only case
B is possible. Since sB is increasing in k, the treaty depth is maximized
by choosing the largest k consistent with
(
(2k − 1)/2k)2 ≤ δ, namely
k = k¯ (∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}), so that s = sB(k¯, δ) and p = 0.
• If there exists k¯ ∈ N s.t. (k¯− 1)/k¯ ≤ δ < ((2k¯− 1)/2k¯)2, then case A is
possible with k = k¯ and, provided k¯ > 1, case B is possible with k < k¯.
With k¯ > 1, it can be shown that, for all δ ∈ [(k¯−1)/k¯, ((2k¯−1)/2k¯)2)
and k < k¯, sA(k¯, δ) > sB(k, δ), implying that treaty depth is maximized
by choosing k = k¯ (∈ {1, . . . , n−1}), s = sA(k¯, δ), and p = 2k¯−sA(k¯, δ).
By writing s(δ) := sA(k, δ) and p(δ) := 2k − s(δ) if there exists k ∈ N
s.t. (k − 1)/k ≤ δ < ((2k − 1)/2k)2, and s(δ) := sB(k, δ) and p(δ) = 0 if
there exists k ∈ N if there exists k ∈ N s.t. ((2k − 1)/2k)2 ≤ δ < k/(k + 1),
Proposition 2 summarizes the results given in the bullet points above.
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